Professional Corporations - Practical Problems and Solutions by Dale, K. Maxwell
College of William & Mary Law School
William & Mary Law School Scholarship Repository
William & Mary Annual Tax Conference Conferences, Events, and Lectures
1980
Professional Corporations - Practical Problems and
Solutions
K. Maxwell Dale
Copyright c 1980 by the authors. This article is brought to you by the William & Mary Law School Scholarship Repository.
http://scholarship.law.wm.edu/tax
Repository Citation
Dale, K. Maxwell, "Professional Corporations - Practical Problems and Solutions" (1980). William & Mary Annual Tax Conference.
Paper 501.
http://scholarship.law.wm.edu/tax/501
PROFESSIONAL CORPORATIONS-PRACTICAL
PROBLEMS AND SOLUTIONS
K. MAXWELL DALE
Significant legislative and administrative changes recently have rede-
fined the means and methods by which professional corporations may
confer benefits upon their employees. This presentation shall address
three of the most significant changes and consider the ramifications
flowing from the new statutory language and case law.
The nature of professional corporations.
Professional corporations differ in only a few respects from other
closely-held corporations. Although the various statutes and regulations
dealing with professional corporations have not yet agreed upon a com-
mon definition, a common thread running among all definitions denotes
professional corporations as those which render intellectual services to
the public. Section 13.1-543 of the Code of Virginia, for example, lists
pharmacists, practitioners of the healing arts, veterinarians, surgeons,
dentists, architects, professional engineers, land surveyors, public ac-
countants, certified public accountants and attorneys-at-law among those
classifications of professionals permitted to form professional corpora-
tions. Seven recent Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation (PBGC)
opinion letters amplified this principle by advising opticians, food bro-
kers, artists-designers, real estate brokers, individuals in advertising and
public relations, foresters and river boat pilots that they do not con-
stitute "professional service employees" within the meaning of Sec-
tion 4021(b)(13) of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act
(ERISA). None of those professions were held to qualify for that ex-
emption from the PBGC termination insurance program because indi-
viduals therein, while rendering services to the public, are not "required
to possess knowledge of an advanced type in a field of science or learn-
ing customarily acquired by a prolonged course of specialized intellec-
tual instruction and study . . . and the rendering of such services is not
predominantly intellectual in character." See PBGC opinion letters 80-9
to 80-15.
Although many of the principles discussed today may be applied
equally to professional corporations and other closely-held corporations,
each statutory definition must be reviewed with care to determine
whether any particular classification of professionals falls within the
ambit of its provisions. Inasmuch as qualified retirement plans and
other compensation benefits are the principal reasons that most profes-
sional corporations are formed and professional persons creating such
organizations tend to be highly-paid individuals, it is not surprising that
new schemes for taxing the benefits available to such individuals appear
regularly in all of the legislative bodies.
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Controlled group legislation-Section 414(m)
Senator Lloyd Bentsen and Congressman Al Ullman simultaneously
introduced bills in the House and Senate on December 13, 1979, which
would expand the categories of controlled groups of professional
corporations which are treated as a single employer for purposes of
determining whether pension plans, cafeteria plans, medical expense
reimbursement plans or simplified employee pensions meet the non-
discrimination requirements of the Internal Revenue Code. This action
was precipitated by two Tax Court cases involving partnerships of pro-
fessional corporations which refused to require the professional corpora-
tion partners to extend the same pension benefits to the employees of
the partnership as were provided the employees of the respective pro-
fessional corporations.
Partnerships of professional cvorporations commonly are formed
when several professionals desire to affiliate but are unable to agree on
what salary structure, fringe benefits or qualified retirement plans they
will maintain for employees. One or more professionals often will in-
corporate and form a partnership with the remaining corporations or
individual professionals in order to solve these problems. The corporate
partners typically hire only professional employees, while all non-pro-
fessional employees are hired by the partnership and their services are
shared by the corporate and noncorporate partners.
Prior to the passage of ERISA, Revenue Ruling 68-370, 1968-2
C.B. 174, held that for purposes of determining whether a corporation's
qualified retirement plan satisfied the participation tests for nondiscrimi-
nation, all employees of a partnership would be considered employees
of a partner-corporation and that corporation was responsible for pro-
viding its allocable share of the cost of all pension benefits for its em-
ployees. The establishment of an employment relationship between a
partnership and its employees was deemed to establish a simultaneous
employment relationship between those employees and each of the part-
ners participating in the partnership.
Revenue Ruling 68-370 subsequently was limited in scope by the
Tax Court, however, which held in Thomas Kiddie, M.D., Inc. v. Com-
missioner, 69 T.C. 1055 (1978), that the attribution of partnership
employees to a corporate partner does not occur unless such a partner
has "control" of the partnership, and that more than a fifty percent
partnership interest was required in order to supply the requisite "con-
trol". The corporate partner in Kiddie only had a fifty percent partner-
ship interest so the employees of the partnership were held to have been
properly excluded from the professional corporation's pension plan.
Section 414(b), as added to the Code by ERISA, provides that if an
employer which is a member of a controlled group of corporations
within the meaning of Section 1563(a) establishes a qualified retire-
ment plan, employees for each member of the group must be taken
into account for purposes of determining whether the plan satisfies the
participation tests for qualification. Section 414(c) additionally pro-
vides a rule for employees of trades or businesses (whether or not in-
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corporated) which are under "common control". Temporary Section
11.414(c)-2(c), Income Tax Regs., provides that trades or businesses
are under common control if:
(a) the same five or fewer persons own a controlling interest (at
least eighty percent of the profits or capital interest) in each organiza-
tion, and
(b) such persons arc in effective control of each organization, taking
into account the ownership of each such person only to the extent such
ownership is identical. For purpose, of detcrmining whether "effective
control" of a partnership exists, these regulations require that a partner
own an aggregate of more than fifty percent of the profits, interests or
capital interests of the partnership.
The Tax Court applied this provision in a post-ERISA case entitled
Lloyd M. Garland, M.D., F.A.C.S.,P.A. v. Commissioner, 73 T.C.
1690 (1979). A professional corporation, whose only employee and
shareholder was Dr. Lloyd M. Garland, formed a fifty percent partner-
ship with an individual doctor. The corporation wanted to establish a
pension plan for Dr. Garland, its sole employee, but IRS refused to
issue a favorable determination letter for the plan unless the employees
of the partnership were covered in accordance with Revenue Ruling
68-370 (the pre-ERISA standard) although, concededly, the participa-
tion tests under Section 414(c) would not require their inclusion.
Determining that Sections 414(b) and 414(c) were enacted to pro-
vide a definite and exclusive answer to the question whether employees
of related entities should be aggregated for purposes of determining if
a plan is discriminatory, the Tax Court ruled in favor of the taxpayer
and refused to look beyond the mechanical rules set forth in Sections
414(b) and (c). A factor influencing the Court's decision was the
existence of congressional committee reports pertaining to the promul-
gation of Section 414 illustrating that Congress had been cognizant of
attempts to circumvent the anti-discrimination provisions by use of
multiple businesses when it formulated objective tests to be applied in
these situations. The Court indicated further that even if Section 414(c)
were not intended to provide an exclusive test, its previous Kiddie
precedent would dictate a decision in favor of the taxpayer on the facts
presented.
The legislation proposed by Senator Bentsen and Congressman Ull-
man has been approved by both houses of Congress and signed into
law by President Carter as part of the Miscellaneous Revenue Act of
1980. Subsection 414(m) was thereby added to the Code to curtail the
use of Garland-type arrangements where 10% or more of the interests
in a professional partnership (or corporation) are owned, directly or
indirectly, by one or more of the officers, highly-compensated employees
or owners of a related organization.
The proposed legislation singled out service organizations in the
fields of health, law, engineering, architecture, accounting, actuarial
science, performing arts, consulting, or any other service field which
the Secretary might designate by regulation as a field in which separate
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organizations are used to avoid any employee benefit requirement. Note
that the version adopted does not contain such limitations and applies
to every "service organization", and defines that term as any "organiza-
tion the principal business of which is the performance of services."
Section 414 (m) (3). A professional corporation or other entity becomes
a "service organization" under the new section, while a combination of
such entities is designated as an "affiliated service group".
The all-encompassing nature of this section, which aggregates related
entities for the participation tests, should virtually eliminate the use of
multiple entities to provide smaller fringe benefits to lower paid em-
ployees than to owners or highly-compensated employees. Many valid
reasons remain for establishing multiple related entities to provide serv-
ices to the public. New Section 414(m) simply eliminates the possibility
of using such organizations to create the abusive situations perceived
by Congress in Kiddie and Garland.
Interest-free loans.
Interest-free and low interest demand loans offer a wide range of
income and gift tax planning opportunities in business and non-business
contexts for owners of professional corporations. IRS and the judiciary
have debated the validity of these arrangements since the Tax Court
issued its opinion in J. Simpson Dean v. Commissioner, 35 T.C. 1083
(1961) (Government appeal to 3rd Cir. dismissed pursuant to agree-
ment), N.A. 1973-2 C.B. 4, but the United States Court of Appeals
for the Fourth Circuit resolved the issue for taxpayers in our jurisdic-
tion on July 1, 1980, when it affirmed the Tax Court decision in
Suttle v. Commissioner, 80-2 U.S.T.C. Par. 9534, aff'g. T.C. Memo.
1978-393.
Such loans confer tax-free benefits upon a corporation's shareholders,
directors or officers in the form of foregone interest even though the
individual recipient may own a controlling interest in the corporation.
The loan must be bona fide, payable upon demand by the corporation,
and the proceeds must not be used to purchase tax-exempt securities.
There is no limit on the maximum amount of the loan, and except for
the prohibition against investment in tax-exempt securities, the purpose
of the loan currently is immaterial.
The facts in Suttle fairly illustrate the conflict. Albert Suttle owned
a majority of the oustanding stock of Master Chevrolet Sales, Incorpo-
rated, was its President, served on the Board of Directors, and was a
salaried employee of the corporation. Suttle borrowed money from the
corporation for more than 35 years prior to the year in issue without
paying interest. The loan balance during the years in issue averaged
$252,000. IRS computed the amount of interest which Suttle would
have had to pay in order to borrow those sums from a third party at
an assumed interest rate and determined an income tax deficiency of
$13,875.51 in one year and $20,159.96 in the other. Both the Tax
Court and Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals ruled in favor of the tax-
payer by holding that interest-free loan cases were distinguishable from
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cases involving rent-free use of other corporate property (such as auto-
mobiles or residences). Cases involving interest-free use of money were
accorded special treatment because the loan could have been arranged so
that Suttle would have been charged with income and also entitled to
an offsetting interest expense deduction-thereby creating a "washout".
The use to which loan proceeds are applied may determine whether
an interest-free loan avoids income taxation. The Tax Court, beginning
with Judge Opper's concurring opinion in Dean, repeatedly has ex-
pressed concern that the opinion of the majority in Dean "is much too
broad a generalization" Recently in Zager v. Commissioner, 72 T.C.
1009 (1979), the Court stated in a published opinion that "we perhaps
made too sweeping a statement in Dean" and further that "if the in-
debtedness were incurred . . to purchase or carry tax-exempt bonds, a
different result might perhaps be reached in view of the provision of
Section 265(2) of the Code which disallows a deduction for interest
paid in respect of such indebtedness". IRS was precluded from asserting
this argument in two recent cases only because it was not timely raised.
The Estate of Leichtung, T.C. Memo. 1980-352, Martin V. Commis-
sioner, T.C. Memo. 1979-469.
Another unanswered question concerns whether the mere simultane-
ous existence of interest-free loans and ownership of tax-exempt securi-
ties automatically creates taxable income for the recipient of an interest-
free loan. In Baker v. Commissioner, 75 T.C. #11, (1980) (Appeal-
able to 2d Cir.), the Tax Court determined that interest-free loans
from a corporation to its stockholder who owned tax-exempt securities
did not give rise to taxable income solely because the parties stipulated
that the loan proceeds were not used to purchase tax-exempt securities.
The Court did not express an opinion as to the use of loan proceeds to
carry tax-exempt securities.
Economic benefits flowing in an interest-free or low-interest loan situ-
ation may generate taxable income for the recipient if a corporation
must borrow the money which it lends to its controlling stockholder,
and the stockholder must personally guarantee the repayment of the
corporation's loan to a third party lender. Under these circumstances
the corporation may be held to be the agent of its stockholder in
obtaining the loan and all interest paid to the third party lender "on
behalf of" the stockholder under such circumstances will constitute a
taxable constructive dividend. Creel v. Commissioner, 72 T.C. 1173
(1979) (Appealed by government to 5th Cir. February 15, 1980, on
other issue). Creel does not give guidance concerning the mere simul-
taneous existence of third party corporate loans and interest-free stock-
holder loans, but IRS can be expected to test this issue as it seeks to
expand the scope of its agency principal victory.
Whenever the proceeds of an interest-free loan are used to purchase
or carry a life insurance, endowment or annuity contract, the stock-
holder-borrower should be careful to pay four out of the first seven
premiums with non-borrowed funds or comply with one of the other
exceptions of Section 264(c). Taxable income similarly may be found
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to exist whenever the deduction portion of the "washout" is barred or
limited.
Interest-free or low interest loans between non-related parties have
received treatment similar to that accorded the parties in Dean, Marsh
v. Commissioner, 73 T.C. 317 (1979) Greenspun v. Commissioner,
72 T.C. 931 (1979) (reviewed by the Court) (appealed to 9th Cir.
by government on November 20, 1979), and interest-free loans be-
tween family members have escaped gift tax. Johnson v. United States,
254 F. Supp. 73 (N.D. Tex. 1966) (IRS announced it would not follow
this decision in Rev. Rul. 73-61, 1973-1 C.B. 408); Crown v. Com-
missioner, 67 T.C. 1060 (1977) (reviewed by the Court), N.A. 78-1
C.B. 2, Aff'd. 585 F.2d 234 (7th Cir. 1978).
Courts which have addressed this issue uniformly have ruled in favor
of the taxpayer where proceeds from bona fide demand loans were not
used to purchase tax-exempt securities. One income tax case, Suttle,
and one gift tax case, Crown, have been decided by the Courts of
Appeal, while income tax cases are now pending in the Fifth and Ninth
Circuits and could be appealed to the First and Second Circuits. The
Treasury Department continues to press this issue and previous non-
acquiescences have not been withdrawn, so the ultimate resolution of
this issue perhaps rests with Congress or the Supreme Court. IRS has
pressed its case to the point where the Senate Appropriations Commit-
tee, in a report on H. R. 7583, the current treasury appropriations bills,
urged IRS to refrain from instituting additional cases concerning inter-
est-free loans as taxable income, at least until it can explain to that
Committee "a rationale for proceeding in a fashion contrary to the
court rulings". Senate Appropriations Committee Rept. No. 96-955,
p. 30, September 17, 1980.
Section 411 proposed regulations on discriminatory vesting
IRS launched a major effort on April 9, 1980, to accelerate vesting
requirements for qualified retirement plans by issuing new regulations
an action which, if successful, will decrease the period of time an em-
ployee must participate in a plan in order to obtain a nonforfeitable
interest in his accrued benefit. These proposed regulations, as amended,
may have serious adverse consequences for small professional corpora-
tion plans in particular.
Prior to ERISA vesting rules lacked substantial uniformity because
the Code did not specify any particular vesting requirement and such
decisions were made by each District Director when processing applica-
tions for advance determination letters. Congress attempted to inject a
degree of uniformity into the system by establishing four statutory vest-
ing schedules in Section 411 (a) when ERISA was enacted:
(a) Ten-year cliff vesting (no vesting until the tenth year of service
when a participant becomes 100% vested),
(b) Five to fifteen-year vesting (vesting begins in the fifth year of
service and gradually increases until 100% vesting is achieved in the
fifteenth year of service),
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(c) "Rule of Forty-Five" vesting (vesting begins when the combina-
tion of age and years of service totals forty-five and attains 100%
vesting within five years), and
(d) Class year vesting (each class must attain 100% vesting within
five years).
Under Section 411 (d) (1) the vesting requirements of a plan which
satisfies any of the above minimum schedules will not be deemed to
discriminate in favor of the "prohibited group" of officers, shareholders
or highly compensated employees unless a "pattern of abuse" evidences
discrimination or there has been, or there is reason to believe that there
will be "discriminatory vesting" resulting in an accrual of benefits or
forfeitures favoring the prohibited group over rank and file employees.
Revenue Procedures 75-49 and 76-11 subsequently provided two
factual tests by which a plan administrator could determine whether
"discriminatory vesting" exists in favor of its prohibited group" for the
purposes of obtaining a favorable advance determination letter. A plan
intending to vest more slowly than the "4-40" vesting contained in the
Conference Report to ERISA, H.R. Rep. No. 93-1280, 93d Cong., 2d
Sess. 276 (1974), could project the "key employee" or "turnover"
tests to ascertain the probability of obtaining a favorable advance de-
termination letter. Most practitioners assumed that 4-40 vesting consti-
tuted an absolute safe harbor except in cases of actual misuse of the
plan in operation.
Proposed Treasury Regulation Sec. 1.411(d)-I drastically altered
this system on April 9, 1980, by eliminating the former "4-40" vesting
safe harbor and replacing it with an "all facts and circumstances" test
applicable to all determination requests. Much more restrictive safe
harbors in this Proposed Regulation require 100% vesting after three
years of service or class year vesting requiring 20% vesting after one
year's service, grading up to 100% vesting after five years of service.
Moreover, years of service for the purposes of these computations were
required to be calculated without the benefit of the statutory exclusions
contained in the Sections 411(a) (4) (A) through (C) of the Code.
This Proposed Regulation would vitiate Revenue Procedures 75-49 and
76-11 and would apply with equal effect to new and existing plans. The
preamble to the original proposed regulation indicated that plans having
determination letters based on 4-40 vesting need not apply for a new
determination letter, but Plan Administrators should be aware that the
new tests will be applicable to their vesting schedules and should review
their plans accordingly.
Public criticism mounted swiftly against the proposed regulations
when practitioners viewed them as thinly disguised coercion into adopt-
ing the more rapid vesting schedules contained in the proposed safe
harbors. Many felt that the new system of guidelines would significantly
increase their burden of establishing nondiscrimination. Some justifica-
tion can be seen for this position in the requirement that the following
factors be computed and compared between the prohibited group and
rank and file employees:
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(a) Employment turn-over rate,
(b) Average percentage of vesting of each employee currently em-
ployed by the employer,
(c) Average percentage of vesting of each employee whose employ-
ment is terminated,
(d) Average number of years remaining for each employee until
100% vesting, and
(e) In the case of a plan amendment increasing the length of service
required for vesting, the percentage of employees satisfying the new
service requirement at the time it becomes effective.
The Treasury Department responded to that public outcry on June 9,
1980, by deleting all safe harbor provisions from the proposed regula-
tions. Thus, a determination of discrimination would be based entirely
on the facts and circumstances of each case. Although the examples and
rules for computing years of service in the original proposed regulations
were deleted, IRS warned that the deletion of safe harbor provisions
from the proposed regulations should not be interpreted as meaning
that 4-40 vesting remains a safe harbor.
Several days later, on June 12, 1980, the Treasury Department agreed
to modify again the proposed regulations. Pursuant to this agreement:
(a) Final regulations would not be issued unless Congress was in
session,
(b) Existing plans which had received favorable determination letters
would not be retroactively disqualified unless discrimination in opera-
tion is egregious (Ex. a 4-40 plan under which only a sole shareholder
was vested after ten years of plan operation or when employees were
fired in order to prevent vesting), and
(c) Final regulations would provide examples illustrating how 4-40
and ten-year graded vesting would be applied to smaller plans.
IRS Release 80-85 next provided examples of discrimination rules
that might be included in final regulations on vesting. One example was
included of 4-40 vesting, and each example set forth a test which ap-
plies to all facts and circumstances independently of the other examples.
Example 5 sets forth a situation which could have severe consequences
for small professional corporation plans which experience rapid em-
ployee turnover. In Example 5 a non-contributory plan covers five
employees and satisfied the minimum participation requirements of Sec-
tion 410. The plan provides for 4-40 vesting but after six years of
operation only one employee, the sole shareholder of the company, has
any vested employer derived benefits. Absent a showing of "other facts
and circumstances" the vesting schedule of this plan is held to be
discriminatory.
Congressman Erlenborn responded to IRS by introducing an amend-
ment to the Treasury-Postal Appropriations Bill, H.R. 7583, which,
because it was enacted, cuts off funds needed by IRS to enforce the
proposed regulations. The relief offered by this legislation is temporary
in nature, however, because the Act will expire approximately October
1, 1981.
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Knowledgeable practitioners working in and around Washington ex-
pect future legislation to dramatically accelerate vesting requirements-
perhaps to a requirement of full vesting after five years of service.
Indeed, Congressman Claude Pepper told a September 17, 1980, hear-
ing of the House Select Committee on Aging that legislative proposals
would be introduced shortly calling for more rapid vesting and increased
portability. More rapid vesting appears inevitable, but current concern
among administrators of small professional corporation plans is focused
on the unknown degree of change that will be required once IRS is
free to disregard the former 4-40 safe-harbor. Wise administrators will
calculate the schedule required for minimum compliance and await fur-
ther developments.
Incorporating the cash basis sole proprietor.
Section 351 of the Code provides that transfers of assets to a new or
controlled cash basis corporation can be accomplished under certain
circumstances without realization of gain on the assets transferred. Ac-
counts receivable transferred to a controlled corporation have created
income tax problems in the past because, although the corporation will
be taxed fully upon collection of the receivables due to their zero basis,
assignment of income principals threaten to tax the transferor on the
accounts receivable when transferred. The Court of Appeals for the
Third Circuit resolved this problem in Hempt Bros., Inc. v. United
States, 490 F.2d 1172 (3rd Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 826
(1974), which holds that accounts receivable transferred to a controlled
corporation as a part of a tax-free Section 351 exchange will not gen-
erate tax to the transferor on assignment of income principals if the
receivables represent -oods and services sold in the transferor's regular
course of business and the incorporation has a business purpose.
IRS issued Revenue Ruling 80-198, 1980-30 I.R.B. 10, which for-
mally accepts the Hemp, Bros. principle with two limitations; (1)
Transfers to a controlled corporation of accounts receivable generated
by services rendered will continue to be subject to the assignment of
income principles where the transfer is motivated by tax avoidance
purposes (which might be evidenced by the corporation not conducting
an ongoing business after the transfer or the transfer becoming an inte-
gral part of a step transaction), and (2) income, deductions, credits or
allowances may be freely allocated by IRS between the transferor or
transferee under Section 482 of the Code whenever the timing of the
incorporation improperly separates income from related expenses and
the income of the transferor, transferee or both is not clearly reflected.
Simultaneously with the issuance of Revenue Ruling 80-198, IRS
issued a related ruling concerning incorporation transfers under Section
351 in which the liabilities accepted by the corporation exceed the basis
of all assets received. Section 357(c)(3), added by the 1978 Revenue
Act, provides that when liabilities pass from one taxpayer to another in
the course of a tax-free incorporation under Section 351, the amount
of liabilities which would give rise to a deduction to the transferor if
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paid by the transferor shall not be taken into account when determining
the amount of liability assumed or to which the property transferred is
subject. Revenue Ruling 80-199, 1980-30 I.R.B. 11, was issued to
extend retroactively the same treatment to pre-November 6, 1978 trans-
actions by expressly revoking Revenue Ruling 69-442, which had
assumed a contrary position, and followed the Tax Court's decision in
Focht v. Commissioner, 68 T.C. 223 (1977), acq., 1980-30 I.R.B. 5.
Miscellaneous issues.
Several items of note occurred during the past year which affect pro-
fessional corporations. Public Law 96-167, passed on December 7,
1979, extends until June 1, 1981, the Congressional prohibition against
administrative changes in fringe benefit law which began during 1978
with the passage of Public Law 95-427.
A National Office technical advice memorandum, published as Pri-
vate Letter Ruling 8003010, recognized again late last year that a prop-
erly established one-man professional corporation may act as a general
partner in a partnership of professional corporations, and further that
the professional corporation, as any other new taxpayer, may adopt a
fiscal year distinct from the taxable year of its sole stockholder even
though the election might result in a material distortion of income. This
result obtained in a jurisdiction permitted professional corporations to
act as general partners in a partnership.
Private letter Ruling 8031028 illustrates the importance of maintain-
ing the trappings of corporate life as all corporate income was held
taxable to the sole stockholder rather than his professional corporation
because the evidence indicated that the corporation was formed pri-
marily for tax avoidance rather than for legitimate business purposes.
The formalities of conducting business in corporate fashion were not
respected by the taxpayer. Among the factors considered by IRS were:
(1) the individual and not his corporation remained a partner in his
prior medical partnership; (2) the individual's interest in the medical
partnership was not assigned to the corporation; (3) the individual did
not enter into an employment contract with or covenant not to compete
with his corporation; (4) insurance policies were not assigned to the
corporation; (5) the corporation did not hire any other professional or
nonprofessional employees; (6) the corporation did not incur any sig-
nificant indebtedness other than for employee plan costs for the indi-
vidual. It is interesting to note that a Tax Court case upon which the
decision was made, Foglesong v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1976-294,
was reversed on appeal by the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit
four days after the private letter ruling was issued. This ruling indicates
that IRS is not reluctant to press an assignment of income attack on
any professional corporation that is not properly established and which
does not maintain the appropriate trappings of a corporate enterprise.
A recent Court of Claims case, Petro-Chein Marketing Co., Inc. V.
United States, 602 F.2d 959 (Ct. Cl. 1979), carries significant import
for the "reasonable compensation-dividend" controversies which have
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troubled professional corporations. The Court listed several factors
which affected its decision in favor of IRS: (1) No history of dividend
payments, (2) bonus and payments were in proportion to stockholdings,
(3) bonuses were paid only to share-holder employees, (4) evidence
indicated the existence of a pre-set bonus formula, (5) no significant
capital investment in the business, (6) bonuses were set late in the year
when corporate surplus was evident, (7) the corporation was closely
held so that all principals were constantly aware of financial conditions
and exercised control over the type of payments made and the recipients
of these payments, (8) officer salaries were higher than salaries paid
to comparable businessmen in the field (9) bonuses were paid only
when cash was available to pay them, and (10) the vast fluctuation in
earnings (and salaries) was not demonstrated to be related to greater
expertise or effort on the part of the corporation's officers in good years.
The last factor injects a new approach into this debate which could
trouble small professional corporations in prosperous years if salaries
are not declared in advance. Moreover, highly-paid professionals sub-
ject to the maximum tax on earned income could suffer higher taxes on
deemed dividends during periods of wide income fluctuation. An ex-
ample of this might be an incorporated attorney who receives a large
contingent fee in one year as a result of a personal injury settlement.
And finally, proposed final regulations have been issued under Sec-
tion 415 that do not deviate significantly from Revenue Ruling 75-481,
which has governed this area since its issuance after ERISA.
Conclusion.
Professional corporations remain a viable format for practicing num-
erous professions and continue to offer significant tax-saving benefits to
professionals. IRS has launched several new attacks on these benefits
which must be monitored carefully in order to preserve the intended
benefits. Major tax legislation is not anticipated during 1981 so most of
this activity may take place in the courts.
